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In the context of these “Reciprocative Rejoinders” on and beyond 
Heidegger and Heideggerian thought, I will voice a few reflections 
inspired by Harri Mäcklin’s Heideggerian reading of immersive art. 
“Immersive art” refers to a rising twenty-first-century artistic trend, 
prominently represented by collective agents such as teamLab and 
Meow Wolf, that typically immerses the perceiver into a holistic 
experiential environment, often created with the help of virtual and 
augmented reality technologies. With elegance and sophistication, 
Mäcklin argues that while, on the one hand, immersive art can be seen 
as an epitome of the production of intense aesthetic lived experiences 
(Erlebnisse) and the subjective manipulation of meaningful reality 
that, for Heidegger, characterize late modern art, immersive works 
of art are also amenable to a more “positive” Heideggerian analysis. 
As sources of genuine wonder, beyond mere aesthetic stimulation, 
capable of transporting the beholder to “another place” and exposing 
her to overpowering dimensions of meaningfulness beyond subjective 
control, immersive artworks also serve a transformative function that 
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potentially indicates a path beyond the objectifying aesthetic approach 
and its footing, the modern metaphysics of autonomous subjectivity. 
Mäcklin thus shows immersive art to be situated on the very threshold 
of the ongoing decision (Entscheidung), described by Heidegger, between 
the modern completion of the Western metaphysical tradition and the 
ensuing transition (Übergang) to another, postmodern and postmeta-
physical, beginning, inception, or onset (Anfang) of thinking (ga 7: 
81/ep 95–96; ga 45: 124/108) – a decision whose multiple facets, listed 
in section 44 of Contributions to Philosophy, include the question of 
“whether art is an arrangement of lived experience [Erlebnisveranstal-
tung] or the setting-into-work [Ins-Werk-Setzen] of truth” (ga 65: 91/72).
 Mäcklin’s double reading of immersive art highlights the wider 
ambivalence of Heidegger’s approach to modern art which, as we know, 
was generally rather bleak and seemingly symptomatic of a certain 
cultural conservatism, expressed in remarks such as one in his Black 
Notebooks on a 1947 exhibition of modern French painters at the Munich 
Haus der Kunst: “What is now on exhibit there (Picasso, Braque, Juan 
Gris) is no inception [Anfang] but rather the end, indeed, the end of 
art’s demise [Verendung]. Surrealism…is the last clamor of the fading 
cry of distress of defunct metaphysics” (ga 97: 300–301).2 But despite 
the disparaging tone of such comments, it is a mistake to read this 
account, which situates modern art within the end of metaphysics, as 
a categorical normative evaluation. Heidegger may not strike us as a 
particular modern art aficionado, yet his main point is not to deny mod-
ern works of art their significance within their own context, but rather 
to try to map that context in its historical specificity. As it is put in the 
1955–56 lectures on The Principle of Reason, modern (here: abstract) 
art “has its legitimate function [legitime Funktion] in the domain of…
[the] technico-scientific world-construct” (ga 10: 31/20). And in a 1952 
discussion in Munich on “Art and Technics,” Heidegger points out:
Contemporary artistic practice has perhaps nothing 
more to do with the previous conception of art and its 
tasks. However, this transformation must be accepted 
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as a task assigned to us [uns aufgegeben]. Saying this 
is not to voice a critique of the works of art being pro-
duced today. (ga 76: 393)
As Mäcklin’s analysis clearly demonstrates, Heidegger’s dismissive at-
titude and his personal artistic preferences, which are sometimes read 
as a flat and wholesale rejection or condemnation of modern art, are 
insufficient guidelines for any attempt to look at artistic phenomena 
within a “Heideggerian” framework.3 Such an attempt clearly cannot be 
a dogmatic reproduction of Heidegger’s idiosyncratic stance or tastes but 
must rather assume the form of an inventive application of the main 
conceptual resources bequeathed to us by Heidegger’s philosophical 
project. Only in this way can it be said to be a reciprocative rejoinder, 
a genuine attempt to think. We should not downplay the hermeneu-
tic relativism inherent to Heidegger’s thinking: meaningful historical 
phenomena are not given to us as objects of approval or disapproval 
according to fixed criteria, but as assigned interpretive tasks that are 
to be understood in the light of their singular historical situation. 
While modern and contemporary art may appear to be anomalies 
or symptoms of deterioration if judged by the standards of classical 
art or the Hegelian thesis of the “end of art,” this simply indicates 
that the position and the function of art have changed; new standards 
must be found for a new era. As Heidegger writes to the conservative 
author Rudolf Krämer-Badoni in 1960, the task of thinking modern art 
(which he himself largely omitted) entails the task of thinking the late 
modern technical epoch within which it is embedded. Contextualizing 
modern art in this manner does not mean reducing it to a mere scion 
or superstructure of technicity (as a Marxist-type materialist reading 
might be inclined to do).
You write that I “deliberately overlook the epoch of ab-
stract art.” To put it more carefully: abstract art is not 
discussed. Why not? Because, in my opinion, there is 
nothing substantial to say about it in terms of thinking 




clarified. That is not to say that abstract art is an off-
shoot [Ableger] of modern technics.4
Mäcklin’s case study takes an important step towards filling this gap 
by thinking contemporary art in the light of the Heideggerian analy-
sis of technicity. It shows that immersive art clearly belongs within a 
wider late modern cultural framework, but is not simply reducible to 
a symptom of an underlying monolithic social totality: contemporary 
art is more than the “cultural logic of late capitalism” analyzed by 
Fredric Jameson in his famous study.5 Mäcklin detects in contemporary 
immersive artworks elements both of the “danger” and the “saving 
power” discovered by Heidegger at the heart of modern technics. In 
his 1949 Bremen lectures, the latter suggests that while the “enfram-
ing,” “positionality,” or “setup” (Gestell) that provides the fundamen-
tal matrix of the technical world threatens to annihilate the singular 
meaningfulness of things – their situatedness in a unique historical 
juncture – altogether, an awareness of this matrix as itself a finite and 
historically constituted configuration of being paradoxically prepares 
the way for another, post-technical configuration (ga 79: 68–73/64–69). 
One of the most important implications of Mäcklin’s analysis follows 
from the fact that this same ambivalence and twofoldness applies more 
widely to Heidegger’s account of modernity in general. In the rest of this 
brief note, I will therefore apply Mäcklin’s fruitful insight into Heidegger’s 
philosophy of art to the later Heidegger’s philosophy of history.
 On the level of tone and rhetoric, Heidegger undeniably comes 
across as a nostalgic antimodern reactionary, glorifying the greatness 
and simplicity of the Greek “first inception” of philosophy in which 
being in the sense of intelligible presencing (Anwesen) and truth in 
the sense of alētheia, the unconcealment of intelligibility to receptive 
thinking, took hold of the inceptual Presocratic thinkers, Anaximander, 
Parmenides, and Heraclitus (ga 65: 459–60/361–62; ga 54: 10–11/7–8). 
On this surface level, the later Heidegger’s master narrative of Western 
philosophy reads as a mournful tale of decline in which the “ontotheo-
logical” metaphysics first introduced by Plato and Aristotle shifts the 
focus from presencing and unconcealment as such to the maximally 
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present and veridical entity or substance, thus subjugating being to 
beings or, to be more precise, to the being-ness (ousia) of beings (ga 65: 
209/163–64; ga 6.2: 312–13/n4 208–9; ga 6.2: 367/ep 4). Metaphysics 
anchors beings in the most beingful being or the most substantial sub-
stance, which scholastic Aristotelianism proceeds to identify with the 
Christian Creator and which modern metaphysics since Descartes relo-
cates into the self-consciousness of the thinking ego as the fundamental 
subject in respect to which beings are allotted the status of apprehended 
and represented objects (ga 6.2: 112–71/n4 85–138). We are told that this 
progressive “forgottenness” of being, its metaphysical occlusion by a 
series of paradigmatic beings (ga 5: 364–65/274–75), ultimately reaches 
its modern culmination, completion, and end in Nietzsche’s metaphysics 
of the will to power, in which being and truth become mere instru-
mental constructions of subjectivity as purely self-referential will that 
solely wills its own empowerment and enhancement (ga 6.1: 591–92/n3 
155–57). In this dreary climax of the Heideggerian story, metaphysics is 
ripe to be replaced by its heir, late modern technics, the ceaseless and 
aimless ordering, disposing, and positioning of beings as exploitable 
resources (ga 7: 76–78/ep 93–95). One important thread of this nar-
rative is the aestheticization of the work of art – invoked by Mäcklin 
– from a locus of meaning-disclosure into a repository of subjective 
sensual stimulation (ga 6.1: 74–224/n1 77–220). 
 And yet, in some of his most illuminating and crucial passages, 
Heidegger reminds us that the lamenting tenor of this account of 
metaphysics as the history of being is misleading. There is a certain 
“determinist” logic to this story, in the sense that it is determined by 
its outcome, in terms of which it is recounted. Metaphysics was never a 
contingent error or errancy of Western thought; it was, as the 1936–46 
notes on “Overcoming Metaphysics” have it, “a unique, but perhaps 
also the necessary, fate [Verhängnis] of the West and the presupposition 
of its planetary dominance” (ga 7: 75/ep 90, tm) – “necessary” in the 
sense that without metaphysics, we could not find ourselves at its end. 
Being itself can only appear in its distinction to or differentiation from 
(Unterschied) beings at the point where “beings have…first entered 




91, tm), in other words, when metaphysics has been completed (with 
Nietzsche) and its initial exclusive focus on the beingness of beings 
becomes manifest in the light of its ultimate implications. The point 
is not to “criticize” any previous epoch of philosophy, for on their own 
terms, they were all perfectly fine. The fact that the Greek thinkers 
did not inquire into being as the appropriating event (Ereignis) that 
makes intelligible presence and alētheia possible was not an omission 
(Versäumnis): philosophically, they did what was relevant in terms of 
their own finite standpoint.
The reason the Greeks did not inquire here is that this 
question runs counter to their ownmost task, and there-
fore it could not at all enter their field of view. Their 
failure to question was…due precisely to their original 
power to stand firm in the determination [Bestimmung] 
meted out to them. (ga 45: 122/107, tm)  
The metaphysics of modernity holds, for Heidegger, the same narrative 
necessity as capitalism does for Marx: the genealogy of the present, in 
the Foucauldian sense of a “historical ontology of ourselves,” cannot 
be narrated without it.6 We cannot understand where we are today, 
the determinate situation meted out to us, without it. Only through its 
ultimate modern phase of completion and culmination can the history 
of the epochal forgottenness of being, like the history of humanity’s 
alienated modes of production, unfold into the contemporary transition 
to a post-history. 
We need to reflect here on the inception of Western 
thinking and on what happened in it and what did not 
happen, because we stand at the end – at the end of this 
inception. (ga 45: 124/108, tm)
The completion of metaphysics as the essential fulfillment 
of modernity [Neuzeit] is an end only because its his-
torical ground is already the transition into the other 
inception. This other inception…does not renounce what 
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has been, but goes back into the grounds of the first 
inception. (ga 6.2: 21/n3 182, tm)
There is thus no real nostalgia, no homesickness in Heidegger’s anti-, 
counter-, or postmodernism. As he reminds his small circle of disciples 
in what was to be his last seminar in 1973, the historical dimension 
of his project was never about a “return” (Rückkehr) to a Presocratic 
origin. There is no origin to return to, home is always already irretriev-
ably lost. There can only be a turn towards (Zukehr) the origin “from 
out of our present age” (ga 15: 394/fs 77) – that is, a reappropriation 
of the first inception of philosophy and the epochal history of being 
from out of its contemporary end, resulting in its transformation into 
another inception, one that has never previously been. If Heidegger 
is a conservative, he is not a reactionary who wants to retrogress or 
revert, but a conservative revolutionary, an accelerationist who seeks to 
subvert by progressing to the very end of a circular trajectory.7 In its 
passage through modernity, metaphysics has ended up making a full 
circle – but one that does not leave the point of departure as it initially 
was upon re-turning or revolving back to it. As Heidegger explains in a 
1971 letter to Gadamer, the required “step back” (Schritt zurück) is “the 
retreat [Einkehr] into the ‘other inception,’ that is, into the one and the 
selfsame unique inception [einen u. selbigen einzigen Anfang] of Western-
European thinking, but this inception thought in another manner.”8
 With these remarks, I wish to submit that Mäcklin’s essay offers 
us an important insight into the complicated and ambivalent dynamic 
involved in any inventive and nondogmatic “Heideggerian” attempt 
to tackle contemporary artistic and cultural phenomena, and late 
modernity in general, in terms of the thesis of an ongoing completion 
of metaphysical modernity and a transition to another, postmodern 
inception. This complexity and ambivalence bestow the Heideggerian 
approach with a certain context-sensitivity and plasticity that is often 
overlooked. In my view, taking these features into account is of utmost 
importance for our current attempts to assess the continuing theoreti-
cal relevance of Heidegger, seriously compromised by the thinker’s 




with the publication of the Black Notebooks. Heidegger explains that 
a reciprocative rejoinder is a hermeneutic repetition (Wiederholung) 
that “does not let itself be persuaded by ‘the past,’ just in order to let it 
recur as something formerly actual” (ga 2: 510/sz 386, tm), but rather 
makes a creative response to and use of possibilities inherent in the past. 
This is what Heidegger’s reappropriation of the inception does, this is 
what any responsible engagement with Heidegger must do, and this is 
what Mäcklin’s essay does. It is more crucial than ever that we regard 
“Heideggerian philosophy” not as a dogmatic set of propositions or a 
normative matrix of evaluation, but as a hermeneutic tool and a heu-
ristic conceptual framework. This is the true spirit of the Heideggerian 
slogan “Ways, not works.”
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